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Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and Practices to Protect the Innocent 
 
Margery Malkin Koosed* 
My fellow panelists have well-informed us regarding the evolving psychological 
research in the field that displays the continuing vagaries of eyewitness identification. It 
is my task here to discuss the varying reform proposals that may help to finally achieve a 
greater level of reliability in this critical phase of the criminal justice process. A 
comprehensive reform that includes tightening exclusionary rules, along with (minimally) 
corroboration requirements for death-sentencing, and more appropriately, for convictions 
in capital and non-capital cases, with a concomitant loosening of standards for relief on 
appeal, hold the most promise.   
The Scope of Our Problem – Why We Are Overdue for Reform Measures 
First, let me make clear that eyewitness misidentification is a significant threat to 
the reliability of our criminal justice system, and the more we learn about it, the greater 
and more acute that threat appears to be.  
I first wrote on the topic of mistaken eyewitness identifications in 1989 in The 
Champion, the Official Journal of the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers.1 In that piece, I recounted the frequency of misidentification revealed in the 
seminal study of wrongful convictions in potentially capital cases prepared by Professors 
Hugo Bedau and Michael L. Radelet and published in the Stanford Law Review two 
                                                 
1 Margery M. Koosed, Dead Wrong: Mistaken Identifications and Capital Prosecutions, Volume XIII, No. 
5 The Champion 42-50 (Official Journal of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers) (June 
1989). 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1400289
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years earlier.2 Their study of 350 miscarriages of justice in potentially capital cases in the 
20th century identified good faith mistaken eyewitness identification as causing an 
erroneous conviction in 56 cases, or 16% of the cases studied.3 As I discussed in a later 
2002 article in Ohio State Law Journal,4 if one added in witness errors that were 
attributable to police or prosecutor-influenced identification testimony (listed in the 
witness error sub-categories of perjury and unreliable or erroneous prosecution 
testimony), that number would surely rise, most likely to one-fifth or more of the cases 
they studied.5 Other contemporaneous studies of erroneous convictions that were not 
limited to potentially capital cases placed the frequency of eyewitness misidentification 
errors a great deal higher, at 52% in Prof. Arye Rattner’s 1988 study.6  
In my 2002 Ohio State Law Journal Innocence Protection article, I found if one 
added in the 66 additional miscarriages of justice in potentially capital cases that Prof. 
Radelet and others identified in their 1992 book, In Spite of Innocence,7 the rate of 
wrongful convictions based simply on mistaken identifications in that group rose from 
16% earlier to 18.5%, and a comparable rise occurred in the related perjury and 
unreliable or erroneous prosecution testimony accounts sub-categories.8  But if one 
                                                 
2 Hugo Bedau & Michael l. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan. L.Rev. 
21 (1987). 
 
3 Id. at 57, tbl. 6. 
 
4 Margery Malkin Koosed, The Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won't -- Unless It Also Curbs Mistaken 
Eyewitness Identifications, 63 Ohio St. L. J. 263 (2002) (hereinafter Ohio State or 2002 article). 
 
5 Id. at 276-278. 
 
6 Arye Rattner, Convicted But Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal Justice System, 12 Law and 
Hum. Behav. 283, 289 (1989). 
7 Michael L. Radelet, et. al, In Spite of Innocence: Erroneous Convictions in Capital Cases (1992). 
 
8 Koosed, Proposed Innocence, supra n. 5 at 283. 
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focused on only cases in both the studies that came after the 1967 United States Supreme 
Court decisions that were the first to attend to the eyewitness misidentification problem,9 
that percentage rose starkly to 32%.10  
So in 2002, nearly one-third of the innocents being convicted in potentially capital 
cases since 1967 were getting there in whole or in part through erroneous identification 
testimony. As I related then, the annals of criminal law appeared to have become even 
more “rife with instances of mistaken identification.”11 When combined with the non-
capital findings of 52% by Prof. Rattner as of 1989, the picture was most disturbing.  
That disturbance factor has dramatically multiplied since 2002. As the DNA 
exonerations have shown, misidentification is a factor in far more than 50% of cases. In 
2007, a National Institute of Justice Report related that over 75% of the first 183 DNA 
exonerations in the United States involved misidentification.12 The latest figures from the 
Innocence Project confirm this -- looking at over 230 DNA exonerations in capital and 
non-capital cases -- a whopping 77% of (post-Wade) wrongful convictions involved 
misidentification.13 As Dr. Watts related in his introduction to this panel, in 70% of these 
                                                 
9 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), Stovall v. Denno, 
388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
 
10 Id. at 285-286. 
 
11 Id. at 286, citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The Case 
of Sacco and Vanzetti 30 (1927).  
 
12 Beth Schuster, “Police Lineups: Making Eyewitness Identifications More Reliable”, NIJ Journal No. 258, 
(October 2007), citing Meetings/Events of the American Judicature Society Institute of Forensic Science 
and Public Policy (in Greensboro, North Carolina), www.ajs.org/wc/wc-meetings.asp, which referenced the 
Innocence Project as the source of this information. 
  
13 Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php; Steve McGonigle and Jennifer 
Emily “18 Dallas County cases overturned by DNA relied on heavily eyewitness testimony”, Dallas 
Morning News, Sunday Oct. 12, 2008. http://crimeblog.dallasnews.com/archives/1008/10/innocent-mans-
idnetification-i.html.  
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cases the identifier was the victim, and in 28% this was the central evidence in the case. 
With 77% of cases involving misidentification, this is justifiably labeled the leading 
cause of wrongful convictions.14  
There is still no clear explanation for the increase in the frequency of errors 
attributable to mistaken identifications over the past four decades,15 but it is certain the 
need to curb mistaken identifications is more acute than ever thought before. Two Texas 
journalists have well-described the challenge that is now besetting all of us: 
Eyewitness testimony is the crack cocaine of the criminal justice system. Law 
officers know the potential risks but are addicted to its power to convict.16  
 
Writing in a three-part series in October 2008, the two reported that Dallas County has 
led the nation in DNA exonerations since 2001, with 19 wrongly convicted persons, and 
“in every instance but one, … police and prosecutors built their case on eyewitness 
accounts, even though they knew such testimony can be fatally flawed.”17 The journalists 
recounted that legislation to require more reliable identification procedures failed in the 
Texas legislature in 2007; that there was no disciplinary action imposed for what they 
termed the lying, incompetent, or negligent actions of police officers; that over 3 million 
dollars was spent in compensating and incarcerating the wrongly convicted in the Dallas 
County cases; and that Texas law since 1975 has allowed for conviction based on the 
testimony of a lone eyewitness and that a prospective juror could be denied the 
                                                 
14 Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/351.php. 
 
15 The varying possible explanations I identified in 2002, 63 Ohio St. L.J. at 286-287, are still viable, but 
the answer(s) remain elusive.  
 
16 McGonigle and Emily, supra n. 13. 
 
17 Id. 
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opportunity to serve if they were not willing to convict based on such testimony.18 
Further, only a handful of police departments in Dallas County apparently had written 
policies regarding witness identification procedures.19  
This is a big-as-Texas statewide problem. All six DNA exoneration cases in 
Harris County (including Houston) were built on faulty eyewitness identifications.20 And, 
                                                 
18 Jennifer Emily and Steve McGonigle, “Eyewitnesses still play key roles in cases where DNA, other 
evidence, is lacking”, Dallas Morning News, October 14, 2008. 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/dnacases/stories/101308dnproDNArobbery.264. As 
prosecutor Kevin Brooks, the present head of the Dallas County felony trial bureau, stated about working 
under the late Dallas County District Attorney Henry Wade, “Eyewitness testimony was gold. If the 
witness said they saw it, they saw it.” Steve McGonigle and Jennifer Emily, “18 Dallas County cases 
overturned by DNA relied on heavily eyewitness testimony”, October 12, 2008. 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/politics/local/stories/DN-
DNAlineups_05pro.ART.State.Edition2.4a899db.html. Joe Kendall, a prosecutor under Wade in the early 
80’s stated “No one ever thought a one-eyewitness case was good. But if you had a one-eyewitness case, 
and it was a rape case, and the victim said that’s the one, you couldn’t dismiss.” Id. 
 
19 Id. 
 
20 Roma Khanna, “Study: Witness Errors Lead Juries Astray: DNA undoes the mistakes on the stand during 
trials”, Houston Chronicle, March 26, 2009, 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/6342269.html. Legislation [S.B. 117] has been 
introduced in the Texas legislature that would require police departments to create written policies about 
their eyewitness identification practices that use best practices. Id.  
Texas is not alone regarding the frequency of misidentification as a cause, or the absence of 
written identification policies in its police departments.  
According to an Innocence Project study in Georgia, for instance, all six exonerations in that state 
were based on faulty eyewitness identifications, and 83% of Georgia police agencies have no written rules 
on conducting eyewitness identifications. “New Study Reveals Deficiencies in Eyewitness Identification 
Procedures; Legislative Review Set”, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, September 17, 2007. The Georgia 
legislature established a House Study Committee on Eyewitness Identification Procedures to take testimony 
and make recommendations on reforms. “Barry Scheck testifies before Georgia identification panel today”. 
Innocence Project blog, Oct. 22, 2007, http://innocenceproject.org/content/957.php. As yet, there has been 
no legislation adopting eyewitness identification reform in Georgia.  
On the other hand, Maryland adopted legislation in 2007 that requires police departments to 
prepare written guidelines that “comply with the United States Department of Justice standards on 
obtaining accurate eyewitness identification.” Public Safety Sec. 3-505 adopted May 15, 2007. Wisconsin, 
North Carolina, New Jersey, and West Virginia also require written policies. See 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/LawView5.php. New Jersey’s overall 2001 Attorney General 
Guidelines appear as Appendix A in New Jersey v. Herrera, 187 N.J. 493, 902 A.2d 177 (2006). 
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according to a study just issued by The Justice Project, only 12 percent of police agencies 
in the entire state of Texas have written policies.21   
As this Texas report confirmed, while it is possible to measure the financial costs 
of reinvestigation and of compensating the wrongly convicted that does not fully tell the 
tale of the societal cost of these eyewitness identification mistakes. The costs to 
community safety of having ended investigations too soon and convicting an innocent, as 
importantly, left the dangerous actual perpetrator at large to commit more crimes. The 
Justice Project reported that the actual perpetrator had been identified in about 35% of the 
39 Texas DNA exoneration cases, but that some could not be prosecuted due to statutes 
of limitations or other reasons.22 All told, “the Innocence Project has identified 91 actual 
perpetrators in the 233 exoneration cases” nationwide, and “estimates that 49 rapes and 
                                                 
21 The Justice Project, Convicting the Innocent: Texas Justice Derailed, p. 6-7. 
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/convicting-the-innocent/. The study opens by relating that the 39 Texas 
exonerees have served over 500 years in prison for crimes they did not commit. 
  
22 Convicting the Innocent, supra note 20, http://www.thejusticeproject.org/convicting-the-innocent/public-
safety/. The Report recounts the wrongful 1985 rape conviction of Timothy Cole, who died in prison in 
1999 and was posthumously exonerated by DNA in the past year, and the two rapes and possibly one 
murder committed by the actual perpetrator Jerry Wayne Johnson in the years that followed Cole’s 
conviction, which was based in part on a suggestive photographic identification procedure. Johnson was 
convicted of the later rapes and was sentenced to life in prison. In 1995 when the statute of limitations had 
expired on the crime Cole was convicted of committing, Johnson began writing to judges and prosecutors 
admitting his guilt of the crime, but his admissions were ignored by officials. See Jim Vertuno, “Dead 
inmate formally exonerated of rape conviction’, Houston Chronicle, April 7, 2009, 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/tx/6363338.html. After Cole’s death, the Innocence Project 
became involved and was able to confirm his innocence by means of DNA testing. Id. The Texas Justice 
Project wrote that had the police continued their investigation after the suggestive identification procedure, 
they might have apprehended Johnson and stopped him before he committed the other crimes. Convicting 
the Innocent, supra note21. A similar incident wrongly convicted Timothy McGowan in 1985, but 
perpetrator Kenneth Wayne Woodson can no longer be prosecuted for this as the statute of limitations has 
passed. Id. He too went on to commit other crimes (rape, burglary, and robbery) the following year, for 
which he was prosecuted and punished, but which he may not have committed had he been prosecuted for 
the earlier rape and burglary.Id.  
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19 murders were committed” by those persons after the others had been wrongly 
convicted.23 The cost to society of these additional crimes is truly incalculable. 
So what is to be done? We must break our habit, curb our addiction to the fix of 
eyewitness identification testimony, or at the least significantly reduce the risks of 
mistake within this investigative process. We simply cannot continue to tolerate 
identification procedures that gratuitously increase the risk of convicting the innocent, 
and fortunately, we now know some of what can be done to reduce the risk and break our 
habit.24 
Identifying Best Practices to Improve Identification Procedures 
At the time of my 2002 article in the Ohio State Law Journal, the American 
Psychology/Law Society (AP/LS) had released its 1998 report “Eyewitness Identification 
Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads”,25 which specified four 
                                                 
23 Id. 
 
24 We do not yet know everything that there is to know about perception, retention, and retrieval of 
memory, of course. According to a recent New York Times wire service report, for instance, neuroscience 
researchers have found a single dose of an experimental drug delivered to areas of the brain critical for 
holding specific types of memory can erase the memory in animals. Benedict Carey, “Discovery of 
memory molecule raises hopes - and big questions”, New York Times wire service, appearing in the 
Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 6, 2009, p. A7. The discovery of an apparently critical memory molecule, 
PkMzeta, that is “present and activated in cells” precisely when they were needed to retain a memory, id., 
could be a major advancement. Neuroscience research is still in its infancy, but even four years ago, 
researchers were suggesting one explanation for lower reliability of eyewitness identifications in stressful 
situations may be that “high levels of hormones such as cortisol and adrenaline that result from stress may 
degrade special memory”. “Study finds high risk of error in eyewitness identifications,” New Hampshire 
Register, Science Section, June 21, 2004 (relating results of a study conducted by the U.S. Navy and Yale 
University). As neuroscience advances, it will bring us to greater understanding, and hopefully, 
improvements in memory capacity. 
 
25 The AP/LS Report, prepared by Gary L. Wells, et.al, appeared in 22 Law & Hum. Behav. 603, 639-640 
(1998) (hereinafter AP/LS Report).  Their study of 40 cases of innocence people who were convicted of 
serious crimes and served time in prison, five on death row, found that 90% involved eyewitness 
identification evidence in which one or more eyewitnesses falsely identified the person. Id. at 605.  
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recommendations that then “represent(ed) an emerging consensus among eyewitness 
scientists as to key elements that such a set of procedures must entail”:26  
1. double blind procedures where the person who administers/conducts the 
lineup or photospread should not be aware of which member is the 
suspect, so the administrator cannot reveal any facts about the matter 
and confirmation bias can be avoided;27 
2. instructions that the person in question might not be in the lineup or 
photospread and therefore the witness should not feel they must make 
an identification, and instructions that the person administering the 
lineup does not know which person is the suspect in the case;28 
3. design of the procedure and selection of foils so the suspect should not 
stand out in the lineup or photospread from the distractors or foils, 
based on the eyewitness’ previous description of the culprit or other 
factors;29  
4. a statement taken from the eyewitness at the time of the identification 
and prior to any feedback as to his or her confidence that any identified 
person is the actual culprit.30 
                                                 
26 Id. at 609. 
 
27 Id. at 627-629. 
 
28 Id. at 629-630. This discourages the witness from making relative judgments [a task reminiscent of 
Sesame Street’s ‘one of these things is not like the other’] about who in the group best matches their 
memory of the assailant. Relative judgment frequently leads to misidentification in culprit-absent 
identification procedures. Id. 
 
29 Id. at 630-632. This would preclude use of show-ups as they are more likely to yield false identifications. 
For further information detailing this recommendation, see Koosed, 63 Ohio St. L. J., at n. 225. 
  
30 Wells, et. al, supra n. 25 at 635-636. This is designed to prevent confidence inflation between the time of 
the identification and the time of trial from playing a role in the jury’s assessment of the witness’ 
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The United States Department of Justice, Office of Research Programs’ had also 
released its publication “Eyewitness Evidence; A Guide for Law Enforcement”,31  that 
recommended non-suggestive procedures but stopped short of requiring double-blind 
administration, and would simply minimize the use of show-ups.32   
Neither the AP/LS nor the NIJ Report recommended recording of identification 
procedures. The AP/LS declined this due to expense and implementation concerns.33  
Though the AP/LS recognized the superiority of sequential lineups, where the 
witness views one lineup participant at a time in sequence, over simultaneous lineups 
where all are shown at once, it stopped short of recommending this as it would be a 
deviation from current practices and the other four recommendations it made had to exist 
concurrently with a sequential lineup to assure reliability of the information obtained, 
among other reasons.34  
 In 2006, the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section’s Ad Hoc 
Innocence Committee to Ensure the Integrity of the Criminal Process (with representation 
of academics, forensic scientists, district attorneys, defenders, and judges) released its 
Report. In Achieving Justice: Freeing the Innocent, Convicting the Guilty, the ABA  
recommends as “Best Practices” a double-blind administration “whenever practicable”, 
                                                                                                                                                 
testimony, and to provide a clean record of the witness’ confidence at the time of the identification. Id. at 
636.  
 
31 U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, “Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement”, at 
www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles1/nij/178240/txt (hereinafter NIJ Report). 
 
32 Id, See also Donald P. Judges, “Two Cheers for the Department of Justice’s Eyewitness Evidence: A 
Guide for Law Enforcement”, 53 Ark. L. Rev. 231 (2000) for a rather critical review of the NIJ Report.  
 
33 Wells, et. al., supra n. 25, at 639-641. 
 
34 Id. at 639-640. 
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and also provides for selection of foils, instructions, and a post-identification statement 
by the witness of the type identified in the AP/LS Report.35  
On size, the ABA Report recommended “a sufficient number of foils to 
reasonably reduce the risk of an eyewitness selecting a suspect by guessing rather than by 
recognition.”36 Noting that though there is “no magic correct number”, the ABA relates 
“many researchers believe that [the present American standard of 5 to] 6 person lineups 
create an unacceptably high risk of error”, and that “Britain uses arrays of 9”.37 The ABA 
recommended larger size lineups “whenever practicable.”38 
                                                 
35 American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section’s Ad Hoc Innocence Committee to Ensure the 
Integrity of the Criminal Process, Achieving Justice: Freeing the Innocent, Convicting the Guilty (2006) 
(hereinafter ABA Report), at 24-26.  
With regard to eyewitness identification law, the ABA Report frequently references the fine 
resource Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Mistaken Identification – The Eyewitness, Psychology and 
the Law (1995).  
 
36 Id. at 25. 
 
37 Id. at 35. In Britain, lineups have been known as “identity parades”, showups as “confrontations” or 
“street identifications”, and in-court identifications as “docket identifications”. See Peter Hain, Mistaken 
Identity: The Wrong Face of the Law 130-131 (Quartet Books Ltd., Hunt Barnard Printing Ltd..1976). 
More recent statutory terms are added: “video identifications” “when the witness is shown moving images 
of a known suspect, together with similar images of others who resemble the suspect”, and “group 
identifications” “when the witness sees the suspect in an informal group of people.” Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act, 1984, Code of Practice D §3.5, §3.9, see Michael Zander, The Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act (5th Ed. 2005).   
The use of eight foils dates back to a Home Office directive issued in 1969. Hain, Mistaken 
Identity 132. 
Britain has struggled with curbing procedures leading to mistaken eyewitness testimony. As early 
as 1925, the Home Office issued a memorandum to police regarding identification procedures, but there 
was “no obligation to follow them”. Id. at 131-132. In January 1969, the Home Office published a Circular 
on Identification Parades, incorporating some of the 1925 directives, and stating in its preamble “The object 
of an identification parade is to make sure that the ability of the witness to recognize the suspect has been 
fairly and adequately tested.” Ruth Brandon & Christie Davies, Wrongful Imprisonment  268-270 (Circular 
reprinted as Appendix B) (George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1973). The Circular provided for possibly blind 
identification procedures: “[i]f an officer concerned with the case against the suspect is present, he should 
take no part in conducting the parade.” Id. at 268. It provided for “if practicable, eight or more” foils “who 
are as far as possible of the same age, height, general appearance (including standard of dress and 
grooming) and position in life”. Id. Further, witnesses should not see the suspect or his photograph before 
attending a parade, id., and witnesses should be prevented from communicating with each other during the 
parade. Id. at 269.  Suspects could change their position in the line after each witness has left. Id. If a 
witness was unable to identify one positively, “this fact should be carefully noted … as should every other 
circumstance connected with it”. Id. Finally, a suspect was to be informed that he could have a solicitor or 
friend present at the identification parade. Id. Photographic identification procedures were only to be used 
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The ABA Report further recommended videotaping or digital recording of lineup 
procedures, including the witness’ confidence statements and any statements made by the 
police to the witness, “whenever practicable”.39 If it is not practicable, then a photograph 
should be taken of each lineup and a detailed record made of the entire procedure, noting 
the appearance of the suspect and the foils, the identity of the foils, and in any event,  
ensuring accurate documentation of the statement of any witness of the level of 
confidence in any identification.40   
On the matter of sequential lineups or photospreads, the ABA “Best Practices” 
states “the advisability of either a sequential lineup or photospread…, or a simultaneous 
lineup or photospread… should be carefully considered.”41 The ABA notes the vast 
majority of researchers support sequential lineups as “producing a lower rate of mistaken 
identifications when the perpetrator is absent”, and resulting in “little loss of accuracy 
when the perpetrator is present,” citing authorities for both propositions.42 But it notes 
that there is “a growing dissenting view among some well-respected social scientists that 
the research has not proceeded far enough to determine under what conditions, if any, a 
                                                                                                                                                 
if a personal identification was not possible, and the witness reviewing the photos (of persons having as 
close a resemblance as possible) “should be left to make a selection without help and without opportunity 
of consulting other witnesses”. Id. at 270.     
 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 Code of Practice D makes some slight changes in 
the above matters.  §3.11 provides that “the identification procedure shall be the responsibility of an officer 
…who is not involved with the investigation.” Annex B to Code of  Practice D §9 mandates at least eight 
foils, providing “The identification parade shall consist of at least eight people (in addition to the suspect) 
who, so far as possible, resemble the suspect in age, height, general appearance and position in life.” Other 
provisions in the Code of Practice D and its Annex parallel those in the 1969 Circular. 
     
38 Id. at 36. 
 
39 Id. at 25-26.  
 
40 Id. 
 
41 Id. at 25.  
 
42 Id. at 33-34. 
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sequential lineup is to be preferred to a simultaneous lineup,” and that “field studies have 
not been administered to determine the practicability of sequential methods, though new 
technologies entering the marketplace now may substantially reduce the time and out-of-
pocket costs involved.”43  The ABA Committee concluded the Illinois statutory approach 
that mandated further study by certain police departments using sequential while others 
use simultaneous methods was “most consistent with an effort to improve the long run 
accuracy of lineups.”44 
To shed further light on the appropriateness of sequential lineups, a much-awaited 
field study using new technology is currently being conducted by the American 
Judicature Society’s Institute of Forensic Science and Public Policy in four parts of the 
                                                 
43 Id. at 34-35. Around the time of the ABA Report, the controversial Mecklenburg Report was issued. See 
Sheri H. Mecklenburg, Report to the Legislature of the State of Illinois: The Illinois Pilot Program on 
Sequential Double-Blind Identification Procedures (2006), available at 
http:www.chicagopolice.org/ILPilotonEyewitnessID.pdf. This study found a higher rate of false 
identifications in sequential identification procedures. Id. at iv. However, it has been subject to intense 
criticism with regard to its methodology and on issues of bias. See a summary of this criticism in Sandra 
Guerra Thompson, “What Price Justice? The Importance of Costs to Eyewitness Identification Reform”, 41 
Tex. Tech. L.Rev. 33, 45-46, n. 12 (2008). An extensive examination of the argued flaws in the 
Mecklenberg Report can be found in a sample motion in limine to preclude the prosecution from 
referencing the Mecklenburg Report that is reproduced in the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers publication “A New Legal Architecture: Litigating Eyewitness Identification Cases in the 21st 
Century” (on file with the author and publication available for purchase at www.nacdl.org/multimedia).  
The use of controlled studies that often involve college student subjects has been questioned, but it 
is suggested that use of these subjects may well underestimate the degree of mistaken identifications that 
could be evidenced in the field, and results in the field have shown errors are often made. Gary Wells and 
Deah S. Quinlivan, “Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability 
Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: Thirty Years Later,” 33 Law & Hum. Behav. 1, 6-7 (Feb. 2009).   
As the ABA noted, computerized lineups and photospreads are being developed that may make it 
possible to conduct a sequential multi-foil identification procedure. See as well the NIJ Report, supra n. 31 
at 9. A suspect’s photo would be scanned in, and then the computer would choose photos of others who 
matched the witness’ description from a large database and offer standardized, neutral instructions. Id. In 
the interim, one of my co-panelists has identified a less costly and readily available “folder method” where 
folders with a photo are shuffled and shown sequentially and the administrator has no view of the photos. 
See Amy Klochuchar, Nancy K. Mehrkens Steblay & Hilary Lindell Caliguri, “Improving Eyewitness 
Identifications: Hennepin County’s Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y. & 
Ethics J. 381 (2006). 
 
44 Id. at 35. 
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country.45 “The purpose of the study is to evaluate the effectiveness of simultaneous 
versus sequential line-ups in identifying perpetrators using computer-based lineup 
procedures in actual police investigations.”46 As part of the study, the AJS and its 
collaborating bodies are now distributing a survey to assess the strength of varying forms 
of evidence in determining guilt.47 
Regarding the practice of show-ups, the ABA postponed any recommendation on 
when “even prompt show-ups (presenting a single suspect to an eyewitness to identify or 
reject the suspect as the perpetrator)”  “should or should not be permissible”.48 Though 
highly suggestive, the ABA noted there is some research suggesting that “a show-up is 
preferable to a poorly constructed lineup,” and that “many representatives of law 
enforcement… described show-ups as common and as essential to effective law 
                                                 
45 “Eyewitness Identification Field Studies,” American Judicature Society, www.ajs.org/wc/ewid/ewid-
home.asp, accessed March 6, 2009.  
 
46 Id. 
 
47 A cover letter accompanying the survey being distributed by email states “The EWID Field Studies 
consist of two unique phases. Under the direction of the AJS Institute, the first phase will focus on the 
collection of data resulting from photo lineup identifications. For the second phase, the Police Foundation 
is developing a rating instrument to be used by a panel of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys and law 
enforcement officials to assess the likelihood of guilt for each ease. In order to do so, the Police Foundation 
is seeking input from legal scholars experienced in criminal justice matters. The information will be used to 
assist with establishing the reliability and validity of the rating instrument.” [April 9, 2009 email to 
University of Akron Law School Dean and AJS Vice President Martin Belsky, copy on file with the 
author.] The introduction to the survey states “the survey is part of a scientific research study conducted by 
the American Judicature Society, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, the Center for Problem-Oriented 
Policing, and the Police Foundation. Experts from the judicial, criminal justice, legal, and law enforcement 
fields assisted in the development of a rating instrument for assessing probable guilt, and [the survey 
responses will help to] establish the reliability and validity of that instrument. …[The survey’s] goal is to 
establish the strength of the specific descriptive examples of information and/or evidence. …[The] survey 
will include two sections. The first is a rating of descriptive examples of information and/or evidence and 
the second is a rating of categories of information and/or evidence.” “Survey Assessing the Guilt of a 
Suspect”, distributed by The Police Foundation to criminal justice experts in April 2009. [Copy on file with 
the author.]   
 
48 Id. at 38-39.  
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enforcement.”49 It concluded further research was needed to craft a general rule on the 
topic.50 
As to photospreads, the ABA Report noted that their use “may be rising relative 
to lineup frequency,” and this “merely underscores the importance of using the same 
principles for sound identification procedures, whether done by lineup or photospread”.51 
The ABA noted “[c]aution in administering photospreads and show-ups is especially 
important because flawed ones can easily taint later lineup and at-trial identifications”.52 
The ABA Report briefly summarized aspects of other eyewitness identification 
reforms recommended by the NIJ, the New Jersey State Attorney General and Police, 
former Illinois Governor Ryan’s Commission on Capital Punishment, and the North 
Carolina Actual Innocence Commission.53 Among these, all but the NIJ mandated double 
blind procedures and sequential lineups; all set a minimum number of foils and generally 
require instructions to witnesses and collecting confidence judgments.54 
The further reforms recommended or adopted by the North Carolina legislature, 
the Justice Project, and the Innocence Project, are compared and contrasted with these 
earlier proposals in a 2008 article by Prof. Sandra Guerra Thompson.55 Professor 
Thompson writes “there is a surprising amount of consensus on the direction legislatures 
                                                 
49 Id. at 39. 
 
50 Id. 
 
51 Id. at 40. 
 
52 Id. at 40. 
 
53 Id. at 44-45. 
 
54 Id. at 45. 
 
55 Sandra Guerra Thompson, “What Price Justice? The Importance of Costs to Eyewitness Identification 
Reform”, 41 Tex. Tech. L.Rev. 33, 42-55 (2008).  
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should take in reforming identification procedures”.56 Provisions for documentation, 
foils, and interactions with witnesses basically mimic those found in the earlier reports 
described.57 
One of the few areas where consensus has been delayed is sequential versus 
simultaneous lineups. North Carolina was the first (and as of 2007, the only) state to 
legislatively require statewide sequential double-blind lineup and photo array procedures 
without exception.58 New Jersey also requires blind sequential procedures, but provides 
for exceptions, and these procedures are strongly recommended by the Innocence and 
Justice Projects.59 The Innocence Project has declined to include this recommendationin 
their package of reforms at this time as it has “often prevented clear consideration of the 
other important and accepted reforms”.60  As previously noted, the American Judicature 
Society’s national Eyewitness Identification Field Studies should further illuminate this 
question. 
Making Eyewitness Identification Practices Reform Happen  
                                                 
56 Id. at 43. 
 
57 See id. at 48-54. West Virginia’s practice is only briefly addressed in Prof. Thompson’s article as an 
example of adoption of less expensive reform measures. Id., at 62. West Virginia does have provisions 
requiring instructions to witnesses, obtaining confidence statements from the witness, and assuring a 
written record of the proceeding. WV Code 62-1E-1. Another section provides law enforcement agencies 
may create educational materials and conduct training programs regarding these practices. WV Code 62-
1E-3. Both provisions became effective March 10, 2007. 
 
58 Thompson, supra note 55 at 47, citing N.C. Gen. Stat. §15A-284.52(b)(2) (2007). 
 
59 Id. at 48. 
 
60 “Sequential lineups”, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/151.php. The Innocence 
Project website includes an interactive map allowing one to see the status of reform efforts among the 
states. http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/LawView5.php. 
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How to achieve reforms, implement them, and have a means of continual 
improvement as we learn more and can evolve even better “best practices” has been the 
subject of much discussion.  
Criminal defense lawyer and innocence reform activist Kevin Doyle has made the 
argument well regarding our need to promptly address and correct the causes of wrongful 
convictions -- that were estimated by Prof. D. Michael Risinger to occur at a rate of 3 to 
5% in just the 1980’s era capital rape-murder cases.61 Doyle cogently argues that if one 
(let alone 3 or 5) in every hundred commercial airline flights crashed, no one would trust 
that system or call that system a success.62 We would be evaluating and making 
necessary changes. We need to be approaching these mistakes with the same sense of 
urgency the FAA responds to plane crashes. 
Many have suggested the changes the need to be made quite soon. Like the 
economic recession revealing bad practices and Ponzi schemes, the DNA exonerations 
have exposed the bad identification practices leading to mistakes. These exonerations can 
only represent a fraction of the scope of wrongful convictions brought about by mistaken 
identifications.63 If we do nothing, the mistakes will continue to be made. Many crimes 
leave behind no DNA, so our ability to avert or identify those mistakes by DNA is 
limited. But as we continue testing prisoners after conviction and begin to perform DNA 
testing as a standard part of pre-trial police investigative practices, the number of DNA 
                                                 
61 D. Michael Risinger, “Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction 
Rate”, 97 j. Crim.L. & Criminology 761, 762, 779 (2007). Prof. Risinger suspects the wrongful conviction 
rate for other interpersonal violence crimes may be at least as high as that figure, but more study is needed. 
Id. at 788, and see 780-788 for discussion.   
 
62 See id., at 791. 
  
63 Wells and Quinlivan, supra note 43, at 2. 
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exonerations will begin to fall, and there will be less exposure and attention to these 
systemic flaws. We may well be at high point of that exposure now, with eyewitness 
identification mistakes and research capturing the everyday reader and television 
watcher.64 But as media attention subsides with fewer exonerations, the political will to 
make the needed changes may diminish,65 so a ‘reform now’ movement is underway. 
Change can begin of course with defense attorneys filing motions to compel the 
use of best practices in individual cases. But though these motions do help to educate 
judges on the issues, they seem to be too-little, too-late if we are to effect systemic 
change.  
Prof. Sandra Guerra Thompson has focused on costs. She finds that almost 10 
years after the NIJ Report, there is “not yet any fundamental change in the vast majority 
of law enforcement agencies,” that most will not make these changes on their own as “the 
police culture… resists change,” and there are concerns “the new procedures will result in 
a loss of valuable evidence,” and about the “training, equipment, personnel and 
administrative costs” involved in reform.66 She concludes legislative action is the only 
practical way to achieve uniform success, and any statutory action “should be 
implemented with few exceptions for practicability concerns and with serious 
                                                 
64 Last month, feature stories detailing eyewitness identification research/reforms in Gary Wells and Deah 
Quinlivan’s recent article, supra note 43, appeared in Newsweek [Dahlia Lithwick, “When Our Eyes 
Decieve Us” (March 23, 2009), http://www.newsweek.com/id/189294], and on CBS 60 Minutes, 
“Eyewitness; How Accurate is Visual Memory?” (March 8, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/06/60minutes/main4848039.shtml?source=related_story, and 
“How Reliable Are Alibis?” (March 11, 2009), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=4860413n%3fsource=search_video, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/03/11/60minutes/main4859708.shtml.. 
 
65 Thompson, supra note 55, at 39.  
 
66 Thompson, supra note 55, at 56-57. See also Katherine Kruse, “Instituting Innocence Reform: 
Wisconsin’s New Governance Experiment,” 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 645, 687-689 (2006). 
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consequences for failures to follow the procedures.”67  Her 2008 article urged providing 
data to the legislatures on the financial impact of all proposals if the reforms are to have a 
reasonable chance at adoption,68 and then discussed the relative costs of varying reform 
measures.69 Though Prof. Thompson suggested it was “probably unnecessary to estimate 
the cost of additional crimes or the costs to the wrongly imprisoned,”70 it seems to this 
                                                 
67 Id., at 39 and 57. The need for strong enforcement measures with regard to any procedures devised is 
well-illustrated by Britain’s experience with the Home Office’s 1969 Circular on Identification Parades, the 
contents of which are described supra note 37. As Peter Hain writes in his book describing the miscarriages 
of justice that occurred thereafter, 
Had these rules been universally observed, many of the subsequent cases of mistaken identity 
arising from procedural defects would almost certainly have been avoided. As it was, the Home 
Office had missed the point by failing to make any effective provision to enforce the rules…. The 
1969 rules were prefaced with the gentle warning that failure to observe them might result in 
judges questioning the validity of the evidence obtained. In the light of the courts’ past record of 
turning a blind eye to the problems of identification, the Home Office warning was an unrealistic 
platitude…. The rules were not technically law, and therefore not an enforceable right….Whether 
a subject undergoing identification was granted his rights, or even informed of them, depended 
largely on the discretion and goodwill of the police, there was no statutory force behind the parade 
rules…. Many of the mistaken identity cases which inevitably continued to occur after the 1969 
rules revealed that, before making an identification, witnesses already knew or guessed which 
member of the parade was the police suspect.  
Hain, supra note 37 at 132-133. He added “the Home Office rules state that a witness’s uncertainty should 
be recorded, but often such details are ignored.” Id., at 146.   
Peter Hain’s book compiles compelling stories of Britain’s wrongly identified, a sad saga not 
helped along by the failure to effectively enforce the Home Office’s rules. See, id. at 132-138. Brandon and 
Davies’ equally compelling work Wrongful Imprisonment, supra note 37, references transcripts and the 
then extant empirical studies in memory to examine misidentification, id. at 24-46, and makes a similarly 
fine analysis of other causes of wrongful imprisonments in Britain, along with recommendations regarding 
additional enforcement measures, those regarding misidentification to be discussed later herein.  
 Enforcement measures have improved in Britain. Practice under Britain’s 1984 Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act and the later Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 has included the 
possibility of disciplinary action against officers breaching its provisions, and exclusion of identification 
evidence. See e.g., R. v. Graham, Crim. L. R. 212, C.A. (1994) [not conducting an identification parade 
when identity was at issue required reversal].   
 
68 Prof. Thompson urged reformers seek help from public policy research centers at universities to perform 
the cost analyses needed by legislators. Id. at 61. 
 
69 Id. at 57-63. Minimal cost categories were witness instructions, double blind procedures, preparation of 
photospreads with adequate foils, where there would be some costs for preparation and additional training. 
Id. at 59. (Some have suggested that the double blind procedure may also involve additional personnel 
making this measure possibly infeasible in small counties.  Kruse, 2006 Wis. L. Rev., supra note 66, at 
687.)  Prof. Thompson suggested costs may increase substantially with using video equipment to document 
the procedure, but this is less burdensome than it would have been previously. Id. at 60.    
 
70 Id. at 61. 
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author that the costs of adopting reforms must be weighed against the significant costs of 
doing nothing. Continuing on our present wrongful convictions course permits more 
criminal acts to be committed by the actual perpetrator, requires us to compensate the 
innocent who were wrongly incarcerated,71 and also suffer the diminution of trust in our 
criminal justice system. Precise cost estimates, it is true, may not be necessary. But that 
trust alone is priceless.72  
Like Prof. Thompson, Prof. D. Michael Risinger agrees that cost is a factor, but 
he addresses it through a “reground moral lens”,73 rather than in strict monetary terms. In 
a recent article, Prof. Risinger proposes a “Reform Ratio” to determine when a particular 
reform would be cost-prohibitive:  
Any wrongful conviction that can be corrected or avoided without allowing more 
than one or two perpetrators of similar crimes to escape ought to be corrected or 
avoided; in addition system alterations (reforms, if you will) that there is good 
reason to believe will accomplish this ought to be embraced.74  
                                                 
71 Though fiscal pressures on states and counties are acute given the current economic recession, and one 
district attorney office has threatened bankruptcy in the wake of a 14 million dollar judgment for Brady 
violations, see “Orleans Parish DA’s Office Faces Bankruptcy,” MSNBC News, Jan. 8, 2009, we do not yet 
compensate those wrongly imprisoned at a reasonable rate, or provide adequate support services upon their 
release. See Adele Bernhard, “Justice Still Fails; A Review of Recent Efforts to Compensate Individuals 
Who have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52 Drake. L. Rev. 703 (2004). Since 2004, 
Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana, Missouri, Texas, Utah, and Vermont, have enacted or amended their 
statutes to make some improvements. Prof. Adele Bernhard, “Table – When Justice Fails: Indemnification 
for Unjust Conviction” (August 11, 2008), distributed at her presentation at the AALS Annual Meeting in 
San Diego in early January 2009 [copy on file with the author]. However, much more work needs to be 
done in this area. See the recommendations for compensation awards identified by the ABA in its Report, 
supra note 35, at 109-110.  The recent decision in Van de Kamp, et. al. v. Goldstein, ___ U.S.___, 129 S.Ct. 
855 (January 26, 2009), involving a wrongful incarceration of 24 years duration, does not improve this 
situation. The Court there held that prosecutors were absolutely immune from civil damage actions under 
42 U.S.C. §1983 for failing to properly train or supervise prosecutors regarding disclosure of impeachment 
material or establish an information system containing potential impeachment material regarding 
informants. Id.  
 
72 “The benefits of avoiding wrongful convictions, providing more accurate identifications, and allowing 
prosecutors to tell the jury that an identification was scientifically sound, are mostly incalculable.” 
Thompson, supra note 55, at 60, referencing The Justice Project. 
 
73 Risinger, supra note 61 at 799. 
 
74 Id. at 797. 
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Under that analysis, blind testing protocols in forensic science and when 
administering line-ups and photo-spreads are “cost-free proposals, presenting no risk of 
losing any defensible convictions of the guilty”.75 Prof. Risinger hopes that “with hard 
[wrongful conviction rate] numbers, and a reground moral lens [his Reform Ratio],” 
decision-makers will yet be persuaded to make these reforms.76 
Other scholars agree that cost is a factor, but would go about achieving reforms 
differently, from police agencies up, rather than the legislature down. Prof. Katherine 
Kruse lauds Wisconsin’s 2005 legislation77 as a governance experiment that produced “a 
breathtaking course of reform” in the areas of misidentification and false confessions.78  
Viewing the challenge as “how to embed proposed reforms within institutional structures 
that will sustain them over time,” she champions the Wisconsin experience where the 
“content of police practice was neither legislatively nor judicially dictated to law 
enforcement agencies”.79 Instead, a “democratic experimentalism” legislatively delegated 
rulemaking authority to local police agencies, thereby giving them a stake in the problem-
solving process and creating an institutional structure to make reform an ongoing 
process.80  
                                                 
75 Id. As there seems to be differing perspectives on the question of whether sequential lineups may create a 
loss in correct identifications and to what extent that may occur, see e.g., the ABA Report, supra note 35 at 
34 (noting one researcher has found a fifteen percent loss over that experienced with simultaneous lineup 
procedures), it is likely too soon to assess whether sequential lineups would meet Prof. Risinger’s Reform 
Ratio. Once completed, the AJS EWID study should help with that evaluation.     
 
76 Id. at 799. 
 
77 WI Stat. 175.50 (2005). 
 
78 Kruse, supra note 66 at 646.  
 
79 Id. at 646, 647-648. 
 
80 Id. at 649-650. 
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The Wisconsin statute mandates local law enforcement agencies develop written 
policies for eyewitness identification in light of the evolving best practices from social 
science, and conduct a biennial evaluation of these policies.81 The Wisconsin courts then 
back-up the agency policies by excluding testimony relating to the out-of-court 
identification procedure when the policy was not followed, and can also compare policies 
to possibly hold a substandard policy to be itself unnecessarily suggestive.82   
Prof. Kruse credits the Innocence Project network as a fine partnership among 
academics, litigators and policy makers that can effectively combine theory, practice, and 
policy to achieve reform, particularly when, as in Wisconsin, a high profile exoneration 
occurs and all the state’s stakeholders are amenable to problem-solving in face-to-face 
meetings.83 Being in a collective problem-solving mode rather than an adversarial one 
litigating constitutional suppression issues increases the likelihood that reforms will be 
adopted.84  
She suggests a state agency take the role of coordinating information regarding 
agency policies and limit access to that data while still allowing criminal defense lawyers 
                                                 
81 Id. at 685, referencing WI Stat. 175.50 (2005).  
 
82 Id. at 690, referencing Wisconsin v. Dubose, 285 Wis.2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582 (2005) In Dubose, the 
Court referenced social science research and held, based on the state constitution, that evidence of a 
showup will not be admissible unless, based on the totality of the circumstances, the showup was 
necessary, and that a showup will not be necessary unless the police lacked probable cause to make an 
arrest, or, as a result of other exigent circumstances, could not have conducted a lineup or photo array; and 
further, directed that instructions be given to the witness, and that the suspect be shown to the witness only 
once. Id., 285 Wis.2d at162, 166-168, 699 N.W.2d at 591-592, 594-596.  
 
83 Id. at 696-697, 703-717. 
 
84 Id. at 721-727. 
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and social science researchers access as agency policies should be revisable in light of 
experience.85    
Prof. Thompson and Prof. Kruse pursue slightly differing adoption and 
implementation methods. Prof. Thompson contends that police departments will not 
make the recommended changes on their own86 and that the legislature should direct the 
particular procedures to be used, not merely require written policies be adopted at the 
local level87 Thus far, several states seem more comfortable with the latter approach, but 
the key distinction among them is whether the legislature has directed the adoption of 
“best practices” and then permitted what may be divergent implementation at the local 
level.88 Wisconsin has, and Prof. Kruse suggests this model.  
If, as in Wisconsin and to a lesser extent Maryland, the legislature does direct that 
local agencies adopt written policies encompassing “best practices” without specifying 
the particulars thereof, and this is a more palatable path to reform for legislatures, then 
this at least engages the reform process, which is a significant step. Prof. Thompson has 
agreed that the process of reform must be an evolving one in any event, allowing police 
departments to incorporate advances arrived at through improved technology or greater 
social science research.89 So though there may be a lag time (or grace period, depending 
                                                 
85 Id. at 728-732. 
 
86 Thompson, supra note 55 at 57.  
 
87 Id. at 62. 
 
88 Only the North Carolina legislature required double blind sequential procedures. The Virginia legislature simply 
required written policies, with no direction as to their content. Id. The Wisconsin legislature directed written policies 
using best practices. Id. However, Maryland directed written policies consistent only with the Department of Justice, 
limiting and at this point excluding blind, sequential, and recording practices. Id. West Virginia requires written 
instructions, a confidence statement, and a written record, but it is unclear whether other practices will be mandated 
when a task force returns its recommendations. See infra note 57.  
 
89 Thompson, supra note 55 at 55. 
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on one’s perspective), while best practices are identified and adopted, the process of 
reform is at least underway when the general “best practices” directive is given. With 
legislatures, starting can be hard to achieve. Thus, the Innocence Project’s present stance 
of endorsing sequential lineups while excluding them from their reform package is a wise 
and pragmatic approach. If general directives to adopt best practices can make reforms 
happen, then that tactic is worthy of support. 
Another helpful tactic is to present a comprehensive reform package that includes 
both averting misidentifications, false confessions, and preserving DNA evidence. There 
appears to be a greater consensus among police agencies and others regarding the 
preservation of evidence and the videotaping of interrogations than there is for some 
eyewitness identification reform measures.90  
Finally, it may be helpful for legislators to begin to think of eyewitness 
identification evidence in terms commonly associated with trace evidence. Years ago, 
researcher Gary Wells made this analogy: “memory is a form of trace evidence, like 
blood or semen or hair, except the trace exists in the witness’ head. How you go about 
collecting that evidence and preserving it and analyzing it is absolutely vital.”91 The 
recent report of the National Academy of Sciences92 did not address the infirmities in this 
area of evidence collection, but the concerns the NAS identified are clearly analogous, 
and its recommendations are transferable to this science. Thus, when developing the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
90 See ABA Report, supra note 35, at 16-18, 21-22.    
 
91 D.W. Miller, Looking Askance at Eyewitness Testimony in New Jersey”, Chronicle of Higher Education, 
Feb. 25, 2000. 
 
92 National Academy of Science, “Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward”, 
released Feb. 18, 2009, hereinafter NAS Report, prepublication copy available at 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook:php?record_id=12589; news summary at 
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12589. 
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standard operating procedures to minimize potential bias and sources of human error, 
proficiency testing, accreditation, routine quality control, improved education and 
training practices recommended by the NAS,93 a legislature could be urged to look to the 
same considerations for eyewitness identification procedures.94  
Indeed, improving eyewitness identification procedures may be more critical. 
When a forensic test is poorly done, there is usually material remaining, and one can 
retest. But when eyewitness identification is suggestively and unreliably conducted, the 
eyewitness’ memory may be so tainted that there is no ability to reliably retest.95 The 
memory is in a sense gone - there may not be a second chance to do it right in this area of 
trace evidence. We have to do it right the first time.  
That latter point does suggest that implementation of reforms should be prompt, 
and that the pragmatist’s position of ‘lay the foundation with written guidelines requiring 
best practices and then persist and persevere from there’ is a mistake, even if it is the 
                                                 
 
93Id. 
  
94 Gary Wells and Deah Quinlivan make a similar point in their recent article, supra note 43 at 24, urging 
court attention and assertiveness: “Today, police carry out very complex evidence collection procedures 
with physical evidence such as blood, hair, and fiber that have to conform to precise protocols and careful 
documentation. Clearly, police would be capable of carrying out careful non-suggestive protocols with 
eyewitness identification evidence as well if courts were more assertive in demanding it.”  
Interestingly, some have tried to argue (without much success) that the lineup and photo array 
eyewitness identification type-practices should be transferred to the identification of inanimate objects, 
such as cars or instrumentalities of the crime. See the cases collected in New Jersey v. Delgado, 188 N.J. 
48, 66-67, 902 A.2d 888, 898-899 (2006), and noting perhaps “in a rare and extreme case, the degree of 
suggestiveness of an identification procedure concerning an inanimate object might be so great as to 
contravene due process rights”, quoting Commonwealth v. Spann, 383 Mass. 142, 418 N.E.2d 328, 332 
(Mass. 1981). 
.  
95 See e.g., Gary L. Wells and Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect: Feedback to 
Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience”, 83 Journal of Applied Psychology 
360-376 (1998); Gary L. Wells and Amy L. Bradfield, “Distortions in Eyewitness Recollections; Can the 
Postidentification-Feedback Effect Be Moderated, 10 Psychological Science 38-144 (1999).  
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approach more acceptable to legislators who may think the top-down approach is ‘too 
much, too soon’.  
I respect that desire for a quick fix. But with this window only being open a short 
while, it is important to gather all the legislators and other decision-makers one can now, 
and together make sure that window will remain open to make the reforms and continue 
making them, even as the window brings us fresh air in the form of new research. So I am 
drawn to Profs. Kruse and Risinger’s views, and would be content with passing the 
required adoption of unspecified best practices, if that is what it takes to keep the 
momentum of reform. 
 
Reforming the Law Surrounding Eyewitness Identification Practices 
Whether we are successful in reforming identification practices, or are left to the 
current less reliable means that significantly contribute to mistaken convictions, we will 
still be in need of enforcement and protective legal measures.96 Some presently exist, but 
nearly everyone agrees they are ineffectual. Simply witness our witness identification 
mistakes. 
So what do we have, and what should we be seeking? Educating jurors through 
admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification practices and reliability, and 
through jury instructions if this evidence is admitted, is minimal protection, but still hard 
to come by. Much attention, including mine, has been given to expanding the 
exclusionary rule so unreliable evidence is never admitted. Recently, I and others have 
suggested excluding death, instead of merely excluding evidence, as a means of 
                                                 
96 The British experience, with the Home Office having written rules for identification parades in 1969, but 
failing to provide any effective enforcement for many years, serves as a gentle reminder. See Hain supra 
note 37, at 132-164, and note 64, infra.   
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encouraging the adoption of better practices, and/or as simply a protective measure 
against fatal mistaken convictions. Others have suggested corroboration requirements to 
obtain any kind of conviction, or specialized appeal and post-conviction remedies that 
may more readily permit the un-doing of a potentially wrongful conviction. Each of these 
measures has considerable merit and a combination of many would no doubt serve our 
goal of averting mistaken convictions due to misidentification.  
Admitting expert testimony 
Judges are still reluctant to admit expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness 
testimony. A 2006 article in Jurimetrics summarized the present state of admissibility 
practices among the states as eleven requiring admission in limited circumstances (often 
when a stranger identification is not corroborated and there is a significant time lapse 
between the crime and procedure), five that totally exclude such evidence (including 
Nebraska in that camp), and the other states lying somewhere between, often under an 
abuse of discretion standard.97  
The Jurimetrics authors challenge the oft-relied-on rationale for exclusion that 
‘there is no need for expert testimony because there is evidence corroborating the 
eyewitness identification’, urging it violates due process98 and citing the 2004 Crawford 
v. Washington decision.99 We now have the unanimous 2006 decision in Holmes v. South 
Carolina100 to strengthen that due process argument. In Holmes, the Court struck down 
                                                 
97 Richard S. Schmechel, Timothy P. O’Toole, Catherine Easterly, Elizabeth Loftus, “Beyond the Ken? 
Testing Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence”, 46 Jurimetrics 177, 185-188 (Winter 
2006). 
 
98Id. at 188-190.  
 
99 541 U.S. 34 (2004).  
 
100 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
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South Carolina’s state evidentiary rule that the defendant “may not introduce proof of 
third-party guilt if the prosecution has introduced forensic evidence that, if believed, 
strongly supports a guilty verdict.”101 The Court found this was an arbitrary denial of an 
opportunity to defend against the state’s charges:102  
The true strength of the prosecution’s proof cannot be assessed without 
considering challenges to the reliability of the prosecution’s evidence. Just 
because the prosecution’s evidence, if credited, would provide strong support for 
a guilty verdict, it does not follow that evidence of third-party guilty has only a 
weak logical connection to the central issues in the case…..By evaluating the 
strength of only one party’s evidence, no logical conclusion can be reached 
regarding the strength of contrary evidence offered by the other side to rebut or 
cast doubt. Because the rule applied…did not heed this point, the rule is 
‘arbitrary’.103   
 
Just as South Carolina could not rely on strong forensic evidence to bar defense evidence 
as supposedly weakly connected to the case, a state cannot rely on the fact that an 
eyewitness identification is corroborated to contend that its case is so strong that no 
challenge to the reliability of the prosecution’s evidence can be made.104  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
101 Id. at 321. 
 
102 Id. at 331. 
 
103 Id. at 330-331. 
 
104 Though a few months later a closely-divided Supreme Court narrowly permitted Arizona to exclude 
psychiatric evidence of mental disease and diminished capacity short of insanity in Clark v. Arizona, 548 
U.S. 735 (2006), this was within the context of a showing of an “undue risk of unfair prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury.” Id. at 770. The defense there conceded that it was within the 
state’s authority to require the defendant to meet a burden of proof of insanity to obtain an acquittal, id. at 
771, a circumstance which is not present in identification cases where the state clearly maintains the burden 
of proof regarding identity beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, the view that controversies among experts 
regarding mental disease and capacity could mislead, and that exclusion would “avoid confusion and 
misunderstanding on the part of the jurors”, id. at 779, is not present here. Courts have not relied on any 
such rationale in denying admissibility of this testimony. See Schmechel, et al, 46 Jurimetrics, at 188-193. 
Thus, while the reasons for requiring the evidence in Clark to be channeled and restricted were good 
enough to satisfy the standard of fundamental fairness that due process required there, id. at 779, that is not 
so with regard to excluding expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness evidence  
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 Further, the ‘corroborating evidence is there’ rationale is simply unworkable and 
fraught with danger. A trial court is not in a posture to make a decision about the strength 
of corroborating evidence “prior to hearing all the evidence and without a complete 
understanding of the case.”105 Additionally, pretrial,  
it is difficult for a trial court to determine whether corroborating evidence arose 
independently of the eyewitness identification. In a criminal investigation, 
evidence emerges from a dynamic context in which each item is affected by the 
establishment of other evidence. Knowledge of one eyewitness’ identification can 
raise a second person’s confidence in their identification, or lead police to use 
more suggestive interrogative tactics with other potential witnesses.106 
 
The difficulty in ascertaining whether one has found truly independent corroborating 
evidence is a concern that will be addressed later in other contexts. But suffice to say that 
this rationale for excluding expert testimony suffers from constitutional, reliability, and 
practical concerns and should no longer be relied upon.  
To the extent judges have oft-relied on a second rationale, that ‘the expert 
testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification is ‘not beyond the ken’ or not 
helpful to the jury’107, this is capably refuted in the Jurimetrics article by an empirical 
study demonstrating that eyewitness research findings are not known to jurors,108 and by 
                                                 
105 Schmechel, et al., 46 Jurimetrics, at 189. 
 
106 Id. (The authors cite Kirk Bloodworth’s case as an example of this phenomenon. Another is William 
O’Dell Harris’ saga, as described in George Castelle & Elizabeth Loftus, “Misinformation”, in Wrongly 
Convicted: Perspectives on Failed Justice (Saundra D. Westervelt and John A. Humphrey editors, Rutgers 
Univ. Press 2005), pp. 21-23. I would also add Ron Williamson and the other defendants in John Grisham’s 
The Innocent Man (Bennington Press 2006). 
 
107 Id., at 191-193.  
 
108 Id. at 193-205. [“As an empirical matter, the PDS poll shows that significant numbers of jurors (often 
substantial majorities) do not understand concepts like weapon focus, the effects of stress, the tendency of 
witnesses to overestimate exposure time, and the lack of meaningful correlation between witness’ stated 
confidence and accuracy in making an identification. Jurors also place unwarranted stock in the eyewitness 
abilities of police officers, they overestimate the reliability of cross-racial identification, and they have 
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other trial simulation studies finding such testimony assists jurors in evaluating 
eyewitness testimony.109     
 The ABA Report speaks to allowing expert testimony where appropriate for an 
individual case.110 Expert testimony should clearly be permitted in all cases where 
identity is a central issue in the case and there is little or no other independent evidence of 
guilt. It should likewise be permitted when identity is a central issue, and a showup has 
been conducted111, and/or when juror preconceptions regarding the specific 
circumstances surrounding the identification are significantly contradicted by generally 
accepted empirical research findings.  
 Jury instructions tailored to the needs of the case 
In the early 70’s, the DC Circuit determined in the Telfaire case that a cautionary 
jury instruction regarding eyewitness identification testimony may be appropriate in 
certain cases.112  Since then, other instructions have come to be viewed as more 
effective.113 The ABA Report urges that:  
                                                                                                                                                 
minimal understanding of how police procedures can affect the accuracy of an eyewitness identification.” 
Id. at 204.] 
 
109ABA Report, supra note 35, at 42, citing multiple studies.   
 
110 Id. The ABA Report references state practices, at 42, and recommends that jurisdictions adopt the 
following principle: “Courts should have the discretion, where appropriate for an individual case, to allow a 
properly qualified expert to testify both pretrial and at trial on the factors affecting eyewitness accuracy.” 
Id. at 24.   
 
111 See Amy Luria, “Showup Identifications: A Comprehensive Overview of the Problems and a Discussion 
of Necessary Changes”, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 515, 549-551 (2008) [“[C]ourts should regularly permit the use of 
expert testimony pertaining to eyewitness identifications, especially in the context of showup 
identifications, given the lax rules of admissibility for such identifications, and, more importantly, jurors’ 
propensity to believe such identifications.”] 
    
112 United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 52,558-559 (DC Cir. 1972).  
 
113 See e.g., Edith Greene, “Eyewitness Testimony and the Use of Cautionary Instructions,” 8 U. Bridgeport 
L. Rev. 15 (1987); the revised Telfaire instruction in Edith Greene, “Judge’s Instruction on Eyewitness 
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Whenever identity is a central issue in a case tried before a jury, courts should 
consider exercising their discretion to use a specific instruction, tailored to the 
needs of the individual case, explaining the factors to be considered in gauging 
the accuracy of the identification.114  
 
Though jury instructions are not looked on by the ABA as particularly effective, absent 
the adoption of other reforms, they could be of some benefit on areas in which there is 
widespread scientific consensus.115  
 In a recent article, Prof. Gary Wells likewise notes the deficiencies in the Telfaire 
instruction, but credits the possibility that instructions more tailored to the case could be 
helpful to the jury and serve as a deterrent to suggestive practices in the future:  
So, for instance, if the court found that a particular feature of the identification 
procedure was suggestive, the jury would be told about the suggestive feature and 
instructed that the suggestive feature can be considered in evaluating the likely 
accuracy of the eyewitness. If post-identification feedback was given to the 
eyewitness before securing a certainty statement, for instance, the jury might be 
instructed “Research has shown that suggestions to an eyewitness that they 
identified the ‘right’ person can lead them to recall that they were certain all along 
even if they were not. You can consider this as a possible factor in deciding 
whether the witness really was certain when she made her identification.”  
 
Whether jury instructions of this sort will have much impact on the jury is an 
open question, but it is likely to serve a deterrent function because prosecutors, 
who are motivated to keep such instructions away from the jury, will likely help 
                                                                                                                                                 
Testimony: Evaluation and Revision”, 18 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 252, 252-276 (1988); and the “Wright 
instruction” devised in People v. Wright, 43 Cal.3d 399 (1987).   
 
114ABA Report, supra note 35, at 24. For instance, the Connecticut Supreme Court has created an 
instruction dealing with the failure to warn a witness that the perpetrator may or may not be in the 
procedure, informing the jury this may increase the likelihood that the witness will select one even when 
the perpetrator is not present, and that “this information is not intended to direct you to give more or less 
weight to the eyewitness identification offered by the state, … you may, however, take into account this 
information… in making that determination.” Connecticut v. Ledbetter, 275 Conn. 534, 579-580, 881 A.2d 
290, 318-319 (2005). New Jersey has required instructions on the dangers of cross-racial identification, 
State v. Cromedy,158 N.J. 112, 727 A.2d 457 (1999), and has developed standard instructions “in all 
eyewitness identification cases that eyewitness identification testimony requires close scrutiny and should 
not be accepted uncritically”, instructing the jury it “must critically analyze such testimony”, and that “a 
witness’ level of confidence standing alone may not be an indication of the reliability of the identification.” 
New Jersey v. Romero, 191 N.J. 59, 76, 922 A.2d 693, 703 (2007).  
 
115 Id. at 44. 
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bring pressure back on their police departments to avoid suggestive procedures in 
the future.116 
 
North Carolina has gone somewhat further than simply tailoring the instruction to 
the problem area in the case that Prof. Wells and others have suggested. North Carolina 
mandates instructions that a jury “may consider credible evidence of non-compliance 
[with its statutorily required eyewitness identification practices] in determining the 
reliability of the eyewitness identification.”117 This is another helpful enforcement 
mechanism for its required practices, and adds to the deterrent effect sought by calling 
attention to non-compliance. When coupled with the more specific instructions tailored to 
the case, it could be quite effective.  
 Jury instructions tailored to the case are thus a necessary part of reducing the risk 
of mistaken convictions based on eyewitness identification testimony. This is true from a 
standpoint of juror education, which should actually begin with voir dire and be carried 
throughout the case. This should include instructions at the opening of the case and 
immediately before an eyewitness testifies, as well as after and at the close of the case.118 
Instructions also provide an incremental deterrent benefit on police behaviors. If a state 
adopts written guidelines and eventually best practices, a non-compliance instruction 
going further than North Carolina’s would be quite appropriate. Jurors should be 
                                                 
116 Wells and Quinlivan, supra note 43, at 23. 
 
117 N.C. Gen. Stat. §15A-284.52(d)(3) (2007).  
  
118 See Sandra Guerra Thompson, “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated 
Eyewitness Testimony”, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1487, 1522 (2008). For a thorough discussion of jury 
education and the studies addressing the effectiveness of jury instructions and the timing of them, as well as 
a perspective on suggested reforms for Canadian courts to prevent wrongful conviction, see Lisa D. 
Dufraimont, “Regulating Unreliable Evidence: Can Evidence Rules Guide Juries and Prevent Wrongful 
Convictions?”, 33 Queen’s L. J. 261, 298-309 (2008).  
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instructed they may infer or presume the identification is less reliable due to non-
compliance.119 
 Excluding Identification Testimony  
 In my 2002 article, I described the Supreme Court’s creation of the exclusionary 
rules attaching to eyewitness identification practice,120 and in particular, the due process 
exclusionary rule developed in the capital case of Stovall v. Denno121 in 1967, and 
culminating in the non-capital case of Manson v. Brathwaite in 1977.122  
                                                 
119 This would go further than the North Carolina or Connecticut instructions, see supra note 114. However, 
investigative mistakes “hurt the credibility of the Government’s witnesses.” U.S. v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 
625 (9th Cir. 2000). A loss or destruction of memory evidence may properly become the basis of an adverse 
inference or presumption instruction, just as it has in other areas of lost evidence. See generally Arizona v. 
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 59-60 (1988) [J. Stevens, concurring, noting instruction given below that 
permitted an inference against the state for loss or destruction of evidence (and note as an aside, 
Youngblood was later exonerated by DNA)]; People v. Wimberly, 5 Cal.4th 773, 793 (Ca. 1992); State v. 
Maiccia, 355 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Iowa 1984); State v. Fulminante, 975 P.2d 75, 93 (Ariz. 1999). See also 
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 446 & n. 15 (1995) [jury instruction regarding police failure to use those 
procedures that have been proven to decrease the risk of error]. 
  
120 Koosed, Innocence Protection, supra note 4, 63 Ohio St. L. J., at 287-298. Since 1967, the Supreme 
Court has overseen procedures in an effort to reduce unreliability and the likelihood of convicting the 
innocent. Motions to suppress or exclude possibly mistaken eyewitness identification testimony rely on 
varying constitutional arguments. If an illegal detention or arrest violating the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizure preceded the identification procedure, testimony 
regarding the out-of-court procedure will be excluded as a fruit of the poisonous tree, and possibly also the 
in-court identification. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980).   Lineup participants who are ordered 
to repeat the words used by the culprit during the crime are not denied their Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination as this is not a testimonial communication. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 
(1967).  However, the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel does attach when a defendant 
appears in a lineup after the criminal prosecution has begun, and denial of counsel will require exclusion of 
some identification testimony. Id. When suggestive procedures of any type create a substantial likelihood 
of misidentification, due process will require exclusion of all identification testimony from the witness. 
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
 
  
121388 U.S. 293 (1967). Such a rule was also recommended in Britain. See e.g., Chairman Rt. Hon. Lord 
Patrick Devlin’s  “Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the Departmental 
Committee on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases” (1976), at 151, para. 8.8 (Recommendation 
8.8 – “We recommend a statutory provision that a witness who has been shown a photograph of the 
accused shall not be permitted to identify him in court unless the judge, having regard to the Rules, is 
satisfied that the showing was reasonably necessary for the purposes of the investigation.”), [see Williams, 
“Evidence of Identification: The Devlin Report”, Cr. L. Rev. 407-422 (1976)]. 
  
122 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
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In Manson, the Court set forth a due process test for the admission of eyewitness 
identification testimony that remains the Court’s approach today.  There, police 
investigators had presented an undercover police officer witness with a single photo of 
their suspect, rather than presenting several photos of varying individuals to him in a 
photo array.  Though the single photo identification practice was unnecessarily 
suggestive, the Manson Court majority refused to exclude the undercover officer’s 
testimony about his out-of-court suggestive photographic identification of the defendant, 
nor his in-court identification of the defendant at trial. The lower appellate court had 
interpreted earlier due process rulings in Stovall v. Denno and Neil v. Biggers123 to create 
a per se rule that required excluding testimony that the witness had previously identified 
the defendant in an unnecessarily suggestive procedure, thus discarding this testimony 
about an identification that was, by definition, suspect in its reliability because it had 
been arrived at through an unnecessarily suggestive procedure, and thereby encouraging 
the use of a more reliable means of identification when it was available.124 But the 
Manson majority rejected this per se exclusionary rule of some identification testimony 
as too severe.125 Instead, a witness could testify about the out-of-court identification and 
also make an in-court identification, unless, under the totality of the circumstances, there 
is a “very substantial likelihood of misidentification.”126 This likelihood was to be 
determined by weighing the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification procedure 
against five factors relating to reliability: the witness’ opportunity to observe, degree of 
                                                 
123 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
 
124 Koosed, supra note 4, 63 Ohio St. L. J., at 293-294.  
 
125 Manson, supra note 121, 432 U.S., at 112-113. 
 
126 Id. at 116. 
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attention, level of certainty, the accuracy of the prior description and the time lapse 
between the crime and the identification procedure.127   
The Manson dissenters argued Stovall had held that due process was violated 
simply by conducting an unnecessarily suggestive procedure, and that testimony about 
the out-of-court identification had to be excluded as a direct fruit thereof.128  They urged 
the per se rule was needed to provide a greater deterrent of unreliable procedures. That 
debate continues today, though the United States Supreme Court itself has not revisited 
any aspect of the matter for 30 years. 
My 2002 article argued that improved identification procedures and a tighter 
exclusionary rule were necessary in capital cases if we were to avoid executing an 
innocent person. I urged legislative adoption of best eyewitness identification practices 
(then based on the AP/LS and NIJ standards), and a return to the Stovall per se 
exclusionary rule standard when police were investigating an offense that is the subject of 
capital charges,  that officers can reasonably expect may be the subject of capital charges, 
or a closely related offense thereto.129  The Stovall exclusionary approach would apply 
when there was any impermissibly suggestive identification encounter, even if not 
actually planned or conducted by the police or prosecutors.130 An in-court identification 
would be allowed only if the prosecution could prove by clear and convincing evidence 
                                                 
127 Id., at 114. These factors came from the Neil v. Biggers decision, 409 U.S., at 199.  
 
128 Id. at 120 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 
129 Koosed, supra note 4 at 310-311. 
 
130 Id. at 311, and 299-302 (discussing the possible suggestiveness in chance encounters that could also 
undermine reliability).  
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that the prior identification was not conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.131 
The prosecution should prove the identification procedure was not conducive to 
irreparable mistaken identification with facts surrounding the incident itself, and could 
not resort to discrete corroborating or inadmissible evidence, or to unreliable 
inferences.132 A preferred option, the article concluded, would be the exclusion of death 
itself -- a bar on seeking death when an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure 
had been used – or at the least, instructing the jury to presume life in this setting to avoid 
a mistaken execution.133 
I was not alone in my criticism of the Supreme Court’s due process exclusionary 
rule, and the drumbeat for change since then has been incessant.134 Some states have 
already made changes by use of their state constitutions or supervisory powers.135 Others 
                                                 
131 Id., and 302-303 (discussing varying tests for admitting the in-court identification). 
 
132 Id. at 312, and 303-305 (discussing reliance on other evidence to show lack of mistake, including other 
witnesses’ identifications). In Manson, the Court had stated such corroborating evidence “plays no part in 
our analysis” of the identification’s admissibility or reliability. Id., 432 U.S. at 116, and at 118, fn.* 
(Stevens, J. concurring, agreeing evidence connecting the suspect with the crime could not be considered 
for purposes of assessing reliability or admissibility under the Neil test, but could be considered by an 
appellate court in assessing whether denial of a suppression motion was harmless error). 
 
133 Id. at 312-313, and 313, n. 244. 
 
134 See e.g., Luria, supra note 111 at 534-535 (discussing differing interpretations and highly subjective fact 
intensive determinations under the rule), 543-544 (urging a return to Stovall if a showup was used without 
exigency or close temporal proximity to the witnessing event); Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanni Shay, 
“Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited: Toward a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to 
Eyewitness Identification Procedures”, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 109 (2006); Wells and Quinlivan, supra note 43. 
 
135 Johnson v. Massachusetts, 420 Mass. 458, 465-466, 650 N.E.2d 1257 (1995) [adopts Stovall]; People v. 
Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 241, 423 N.E.2d 379 (1981) [same]; Utah v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991) 
[altering the “reliability factors” to use: the witness’ opportunity to view the actor during the event, the 
witness’ degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event, the witness’ capacity to observe the event, 
including his or her physical and mental acuity, whether the identification was spontaneous and remained 
consistent thereafter, whether it was the product of suggestion, and the nature of the event being observed 
and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember, and relate it correctly, including in the latter 
whether the event was an ordinary one in the mind of an observer and whether the race of the actor was the 
same as the race of the observer]; Kansas v. Hunt, 275 Kan. 811, 69 P.3d 571, 576 (2003) [refines 
reliability factors to use those found in Utah v. Ramirez]; Wisconsin v. Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 148, 699 
N.W.2d 582, 584-585 (2005) [finding strong support from its state constitution, declines per se 
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may be spurred to change by the excellent article by Gary Wells and Deah Quinlivan 
published in February, “Suggestive Identifications and the Supreme Court’s Reliability 
Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: Thirty Years Later.”136  The article is a head-on 
social science assault on the Court’s present exclusionary rule test.   
Wells and Quinlivan write that rather than deterring suggestive procedures, 
“Manson has had the unintended consequence of setting up conditions that create a 
positive incentive for police to use suggestive procedures.”137 Though “courts seem to 
assume that a misidentification resulting from a suggestive procedure can somehow be 
corrected later by using a fair procedure,” the social science does not generally accept the 
idea this can somehow be erased.138 Instead, the earlier procedure taints memory, 
replacing or blending it.139 Though in theory a strong memory could be so reliable that it 
trumps weak suggestiveness, there are almost no cases this clear.140 More troubling, the 
Court’s test does not attend to biasing post-identification feedback,141 none of the five so-
called reliability factors are unequivocally related to accuracy, and “three of the five 
                                                                                                                                                 
exclusionary rule of Stovall, but an out of court showup is only admissible if it was necessary, and only 
necessary when the police lacked probable cause to make an arrest, or as a result of other exigent 
circumstances, police could not have conducted a lineup or photo array; Court also requires warning 
regarding culprit may or may not be in the lineup, and only one showing of the suspect. Id. at 168, 594.]; 
New Jersey v. Delgado, 188 N.J. 48, 51, 902 A.2d 888, 890 (2006) [requires, as a condition to the 
admissibility of out-of-court identification, that the police record, to the extent feasible, the dialogue 
between witnesses and police during an identification procedure]. 
 
136 Wells and Quinlivan, supra note 43.  
 
137 Id., at 5.  
 
138 Id. at 16. 
 
139 Id. at 17. 
 
140 Id. at 18. 
 
141 Id. at 17. 
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(certainty, view, and attention) are self-reports that are themselves products of suggestive 
procedures.”142  
Wells and Quinlivan rightly state “for deterrence to work, the use of a suggestive 
procedure must lower the chances that the witness will receive a passing score in the 
second inquiry in Manson,” but, instead “the test actually raises the score.”143 “As a 
result, 
there is almost no threat of exclusion resulting from the use of suggestive 
procedures. In other words, the inflated certainty, statement of view, and 
statement of attention resulting from suggestive procedures effectively guards 
against exclusion, thereby undermining incentives to avoid suggestive 
procedures.144 
 
Worse, Manson may actually encourage suggestive procedures. 
We believe a case can be made that the Manson approach not only undermines 
incentives to avoid suggestive procedures but also provides an incentive to use 
suggestive procedures. As any police officer knows, the ideal witness for 
purposes of obtaining a prosecution is one who is certain and who describes the 
witnessing conditions in a favorable light. If the Manson hearing is not going to 
result in the exclusion of the identification anyway, then why not use suggestive 
procedures to make sure that the witness not only picks the suspect but also 
expresses high certainty, reports an exaggeratedly good view, and claims to have 
paid close attention?145  
 
Appreciating this “might appear cynical or accusatory”, the two respond:  
We do not intend it to be so. Police are just people and people respond to 
contingencies and incentives, often without an explicit awareness of what they are 
doing or why they are doing it. A justice motive, resulting from a belief that they 
have the right person and need to help the witness along, might very well be 
behind the continued prevalence of suggestive procedures. But, as long as the 
Manson test continues to be applied the way it is today, there is no reason to 
                                                 
142 Id. at 18. 
 
143 Id. at 19. 
   
144 Id. 
 
145 Id. 
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expect the contingencies and incentives themselves to somehow reduce the use of 
suggestive identification procedures.146 
 
Complicating this already inadequate test as conjured up by the Court is the failure of the 
lower courts to follow its very modest constraints, contend Wells and Quinlivan. Judges 
accept statements of certainty reflecting points after the identification procedure, rather 
than at the time of the identification procedure.147 They consider descriptions given after 
the identification or after having viewed the suspect instead of those given before.148 
When factors are weak, a stronger (or perceived stronger) factor can overcome and 
displace it.149 The two suggest “perhaps the criteria are just too flexible to be 
meaningful.”150  
In proposing alternatives to the present exclusionary rule, Wells and Quinlivan 
support the incentives of the per se exclusionary rule, but do not favor “a hard and fast 
version” because, they suggest, such a version would exclude all identification testimony 
from a witness whenever a suggestive procedure had occurred, and this would free the 
guilty even when suggestiveness is outweighed by the strength of the witness’ 
memory.151  
                                                 
146 Id. 
 
147 Id. at 20. 
 
148 Id. 
 
149 Id. 
 
150 Id. 
 
151 Id. at 22: “First, witnessing conditions can exist that would make the use of a suggestive procedure a 
moot consideration because the strength of the witness' memory would outweigh the suggestiveness factors 
(recall our abduction example [where the witness spent 3 months with the unmasked culprit, at 9]). Clearly, 
per se exclusion in this particular situation would result in a guilty person going free.” 
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This is not cause for concern or putting aside the per se rule, however, because the 
version of the per se exclusionary rule as it was interpreted in cases following Stovall and 
as considered by the Court itself in Manson, was not so hard and fast, and did not involve 
excluding all identification evidence -- only testimony relating to the out-of-court 
identification was per se excluded.152 An in-court identification could still be made if the 
prosecution proved the in-court identification was “reliable”, or that the pretrial 
identification procedure was not “conducive to irreparable mistaken identification,” or as 
framed in the Manson appellate court below, that there was no “substantial likelihood of 
irreparable mistaken identification” arising from the suggestive procedure.153 Therefore, 
under this per se rule, if the strength of the witness’ memory did indeed outweigh the 
suggestiveness factors, the witness in Wells and Quinlivan’s example could still make an 
in-court identification and the defendant may well be convicted. Thus, though the two did 
not make this clear, it would appear that they would support the per se rule that was 
actually in use before the United States Supreme Court rejected it in Manson, the one I 
have advocated we return to. 
 The second concern Wells and Quinlivan posit is that the per se rule is limited to 
unnecessarily suggestive procedures, when the problems are there with any suggestive 
procedure, whether or not necessary.154 It can be contended that the latter may not be 
                                                 
152 Manson, 432 U.S., at 110, fn. 10; see also Koosed, supra note 4 at 292-294, citing Brathwaite v. 
Manson, 527 F.3d 363, 366-371 (2d Cir. 1975), . 
 
153 Id., 432 U.S., at 110, fn. 10 (allowing that the in-court identification is admissible under the per se rule if 
it is reliable); Koosed, supra note 4 at 292-294 (referencing courts looking to whether the out of court 
identification was conducive to irreparable mistaken identification); Brathwaite, 527 F.3d, at 370 
(referencing no substantial likelihood of irreparable mistaken identification, quoting Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).) 
 
154 Wells and Quinlivan, supra note 43, 33 Law & Hum. B., at 20-21.   
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what was intended in Manson, where the Court spoke only to weighing the “corrupting 
effect of the suggestive procedure” and did not focus at that point in the totality of the 
circumstances analysis on the necessary nature, 155 perhaps as it was less concerned with 
whether a more reliable procedure was available at that point. But this is how the test is 
often applied in the lower courts -- though some do not find the deterrence rationale 
determinative and instead look simply to suggestiveness and are willing to suppress 
though the identification may not have been the product of culpability on the part of the 
police.156 As noted earlier, I have argued the exclusion should not be limited to police 
practices, and should apply to even chance encounters that are suggestive. Wells and 
Quinlivan, it appears, agree that the present rule is too limited in that respect. 
 Indeed, Wells and Quinlivan ultimately propose a shift-of-burden notion 
following a suggestive identification procedure, under which, much like mine, “the 
prosecution would have to make the case that the identification was reliable regardless of 
whether a suggestive procedure was necessary or unnecessary.”157 It is unclear whether 
under their proposed alternative to Manson, the witness could testify as to both the out-
of-court identification and an in-court identification if the prosecution meets its burden. 
Under the per se approach in the lower court in Manson, as noted earlier, the out-of-court 
identification would be excluded, while the in-court identification could come in under 
some circumstances.158 Since the necessity aspect is being deleted, and it appears they 
may be perceiving the per se rule differently, it is likely Wells and Quinlivan intend this 
                                                 
155 Manson, 432 U.S., at 114, and see 117 (the failure to use another procedure was not one of 
constitutional dimension). 
 
156 See Koosed, supra note 4 at 299-302.   
 
157 Wells and Quinlivan, supra note 43 at 22. 
 
158 See text to and footnotes 152 and 153 above. 
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to be an all-or-nothing approach like the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to in Manson, where 
either both forms of identification come in or not. But my proposal remains use of the 
Stovall and Manson lower court approach, with exclusion of the out-of-court 
identification for deterrent purposes and to further avert mistake, at least in capital cases.   
 Wells and Quinlivan would bar the government from proving reliability by using 
“a witness’ certainty, view, or attention, unless it is demonstrably shown that these self-
reports were reliable.”159 A prosecutor must find evidence of reliability “that is 
independent of the suggestive procedure.”160 This should pressure police to collect 
detailed statements from witnesses early in the investigative process and prior to the 
possibility of suggestiveness, a very helpful development.161 It should also diminish 
suggestive practices because self-reporting factors cannot be used once a suggestive 
procedure has occurred.162  
This position regarding evidence available to prove reliability is welcome in that 
it denies the ability to use self-reporting factors that do not really prove reliability. It is 
consistent with my own suggestion that the prosecution should not prove the 
identification procedure’s reliability by resorting to inadmissible evidence or unreliable 
inferences.163  
                                                 
 
159 Id. 
 
160 Id., at 22, 23. 
 
161 Id., at 22.  
 
162 Id. at 22-23. 
 
163 Koosed, supra note 4 at 312. 
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If by permitting evidence that is independent of the suggestive procedure this 
would allow extraneous corroborating evidence of guilt to prove reliability, then this 
would be inconsistent with the Court’s view in Manson that such evidence plays no part 
in the analysis of admissibility.164 However, the Court may have allowed such evidence 
in to show the harmlessness of a denial of suppression,165 and perhaps the distinction is 
not really significant, unless it would impact on the deterrent effect, which it might. But 
still, the critical concern is avoiding mistake, and that the corroborating evidence in fact 
be independent. If their criteria are followed, there may be a lesser deterrent effect arising 
out of cases where guilt was clear, but at least there would not be the risk of mistake in 
that case. That is an acceptable trade-off.  
It has been suggested that the exclusionary rule does not have much teeth because 
courts don’t have the stomach for silencing a witness, especially a victim.166 There may 
be some credence for this proposition. But if the evidence is reliable, the witness can still 
provide an in-court identification as noted; and if not, the witness should be heard on 
their other observations, but not on their identification. Courts need to be reminded that 
they cannot stomach, or afford (societally or economically), a wrongful conviction.   
 Blending the Wells and Quinlivan test with a per se exclusionary approach that 
excludes the testimony relating to the out-of-court identification procedure if an 
identification procedure was suggestive, but allows the in-court identification to be made 
if the prosecution proves it is based on independent evidence is very close to the original 
Stovall test, the one I advocated we should return to in 2002. Adding that the prosecution 
                                                 
164 See footnote 131, infra.  
 
165 Id. 
 
166 Thompson, supra note 118 at 1525.   
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cannot use self-reporting matters unless the prosecution demonstrates these are reliable is 
also consistent with that approach, and essential given what we now know from social 
science studies. Tightly construing the accuracy of the prior description factor so as to 
include only a truly prior description will also enhance reliability. All in all, this could be 
an ideal exclusionary rule formulation.  
Though the United States Supreme Court may not be the most receptive court 
when it comes to social and other science evidence, they have had their moments. Their 
decisions in the capital cases of Roper v. Simmons167 and Atkins v. Virginia168 provide 
some indication they will look to science for relevant information. Additionally, the 
extended discussion in Kansas v. Marsh169 suggests the four dissenters (Justices Souter, 
Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer) are quite sensitive to DNA exonerations and the causes of  
wrongful capital convictions. To be sure, my concern rose when the Supreme Court 
recently ordered re-briefing in the pending Montejo v. California170 on whether Michigan 
v. Jackson171 should be overruled, given that its Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
exclusionary rule may well provide added protection against false confessions. However, 
the Court’s new decision in Corley v. United States172 rejecting an argument that 
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Congress had abrogated the McNabb-Mallory confessions exclusionary rule173 was 
encouraging, particularly where the court referenced “there is mounting empirical 
evidence that (custodial) pressures can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people 
to confess to crimes they never committed.”174   
Perhaps the Court will soon be ready to address this eyewitness empirical 
evidence, at least in capital cases, and finally revise its due process identification 
evidence exclusionary rule. As the Manson test itself is a totality of the circumstances 
one, its own malleability may open it up to a tinkering or refining that allows empirical 
research to be added in to the equation. In any event, these issues should continue to be 
taken to the state courts and legislatures.175 Exclusion should also be viewed as an 
appropriate remedy for breaching guidelines, even if no alteration of the due process 
exclusionary rule is ultimately made.176 
      Wells and Quinlivan proffer another more limited exclusionary rule approach 
which also has considerable merit. A court could consider limiting some testimony of the 
eyewitness, when outright exclusion is too extreme a remedy.177  
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Suppose, for instance, that the eyewitness received confirming feedback at the 
lineup and the certainty statement was taken after the feedback. A judge might 
rule that the witness could testify about the identification, but could not testify 
about his or her certainty. Likewise, suppose that an eyewitness gave a vague pre-
lineup description of the culprit but began to give descriptions that are more 
detailed after the identification. A judge could rule that the witness can testify as 
to the pre-lineup description but not the post-lineup description. Alternatively, 
suppose that a witness made a tentative identification and then was shown a 
second lineup in which the only person in common was the defendant and 
positively identified him. A judge could rule that testimony regarding the initial 
tentative identification could be used at trial, but the second (more certain) 
identification could not become part of the testimony. Every case would be a 
different set of facts, but the point is that total exclusion is not the only option in 
some cases.178 
 
Again, this may reflect a greater concern than is necessary here, as the per se rule is not 
so extreme. However, the suggestion of tailoring exclusion to the specific problem at 
hand is an inviting alternative if the blended per se exclusionary rule above is not 
adopted.   
 Corroboration and Conviction/Execution Evidentiary Requirements 
 Our quest for greater assurance against mistaken convictions and executions has 
led to an outpouring of proposals to ratchet-up the system’s reliability. In a 2001 article I 
urged adopting the Model Penal Code 210.6 provision that barred the death penalty if the 
evidence did not foreclose all doubt about guilt.179 My 2002 article argued for a tighter 
eyewitness identification rule, and preferably, excluding death when a suggestive 
identification procedure occurred to avert mistaken executions. At the time, I thought 
                                                 
178 Id. 
 
179 Koosed, "Averting Mistaken Executions by Adopting the Model Penal Code Exclusion of Death in the 
Presence of Lingering Doubt", 21 Northern Illinois Law Review 41 (2001) (also arguing, at the very least, 
for jury instructions permitting consideration of residual doubt about guilt as a mitigating circumstance). 
 
 46
these were necessary but rather unlikely reforms. However, recent scholarship and events 
have convinced me they are not outliers and that such reforms are truly possible.   
 To survey the scholarship first, suffice to say that requiring corroboration of 
eyewitness testimony to avoid mistakes is not a new idea, its roots can be found in 
ancient Talmudic texts.180 In the 1976 “Report to the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department of the Departmental Committee on Evidence of Identification in Criminal 
Cases,” Lord Patrick Devlin conceded “the only way of diminishing the risk is by the 
erection of general safeguards which will inevitably increase the burden of proof.”181 The 
Devlin Committee recommended a corroboration requirement: 
We do however wish to ensure that in ordinary cases prosecutions are not brought 
on eye-witness evidence only and that, if brought, they will fail. We think that 
they ought to fail, since in our opinion it is only in exceptional cases that 
identification evidence is by itself sufficiently reliable to exclude a reasonable 
doubt about guilt. We recommend that the trial judge should be required by 
statute: a. to direct the jury that is not safe to convict upon eyewitness evidence 
unless the circumstances of the identification are exceptional or the eye-witness 
evidence is supported by substantial evidence of another sort; and b. to indicate to 
the jury the circumstances, if any, which they might regard as exceptional and the 
evidence, if any, which they might regard as supportive of the identification; and 
c. if he is unable to indicate either such circumstances or such evidence, to direct 
the jury to return a verdict of not guilty.182 
 
Likewise, Prof. Sandra Guerra Thompson’s article, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? 
Reconsidering Uncorroborated Eyewitness Testimony,183 proposes requiring 
corroborating evidence in cases involving eyewitness identification, “especially for 
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extremely violent crimes”184 unless the witness knew the culprit before the crime.185 She 
contends there is “a substantial margin of error that cannot be eliminated” even with best 
practices,186 and that “actors in the criminal justice system can do nothing to improve a 
witness’ innate perception and memory failings.”187 A corroboration requirement is also 
helpful, she posits, as it relieves the prosecutor of the moral dilemma of how to deal with  
a witness-victim who can make an identification but where this is the only evidence in 
the case, by allowing him or her to just say no until the police have fulfilled their 
responsibility to obtain other evidence.188  
As with Wells and Quinlivan’s proposal, Prof. Thompson’s will create a strong 
motivation for police to investigate the case further, a needed improvement in the system. 
How best to obtain corroborating evidence is left entirely within the discretion of police 
investigators under Prof. Guerra’s proposal.189 Importantly, however, like Wells and 
Quinlivan, she “requires some genuine investigative work to uncover other independent 
evidence linking the suspect to the crime.”190  
This requirement of independent corroborating evidence is critical. Professors 
George Castelle and Elizabeth Loftus write in “Misinformation” (included in the 
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excellent essay collection Wrongly Convicted: Perspectives on Failed Justice)191 that 
cross-contamination of evidence is common in wrongful conviction cases.192 Evidence 
does not exist in discrete and immutable units, with each piece isolated. One mistake 
causes other things to happen as the mistake transforms thought, memories, and approach 
to potentially every other piece of evidence.193 Knowledge that an identification was 
made or a confession given can permeate every aspect of a case, even if excluded from 
trial.194 Misinformation can even prompt forensic examiners making somewhat subjective 
or ambiguous judgment calls to confirm what the misinformation found.195 Post-event 
information alters decision-making, and may cause prosecutors to reinterpret all they 
perceive in light of the contaminating effect of the knowledge of ‘guilt.’196 Profs. Castelle 
and Loftus argue it is critical to understand this cross-contamination potential and 
implement safeguards against it.197 Jurisdictions can minimize cross-contamination by 
“carefully recording and disclosing witnesses’ initial observations before exposing a 
witness to post-event information.”198  
The independent corroborating evidence requirement Prof. Thompson and others 
have proposed must therefore be accompanied by requiring a written contemporaneous 
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record of a witness’ initial observations. This is presently included in recommended best 
practices for eyewitness identification,199 but not yet fully expected in other investigative 
areas that may serve as the source for corroborating evidence.  
A related requirement is that the independent corroborating evidence itself be 
reliable. As Prof. Thompson states, “extreme care should be taken not to allow one type 
of unreliable evidence to corroborate another.”200 Thus, confessions from juveniles or the 
mentally retarded, or jailhouse snitch testimony, should not be used to corroborate 
eyewitness identification testimony.201    
  A requirement of strong corroboration with other independent and reliable 
evidence has also been proposed in Professors Boaz Sangero and Mordechai Halpert’s 
extensively researched study and article “Why Convictions Should Not Be Based on a 
Single Piece of Evidence: A Proposal for Reform:”202  
Reality and research indeed prove that in a significant number of cases of 
wrongful conviction based on eyewitness testimony, there was no other 
significant evidence that tied the suspect to the crime. Therefore, a requirement 
for “strong corroboration” to eyewitness testimony should be established in 
legislation as an essential condition for a conviction based on such evidence.203 
 
As its title suggests, after study, the authors would go further and urge a legislative 
requirement of “strong corroboration” to convict in all cases involving any single piece of 
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evidence.204   Their unequivocal requirement for “strong corroboration” to the main 
evidence in a case would require “independent and significant additional evidence 
indicating that the defendant is the perpetrator.”205 
Requiring corroboration to convict in all cases would inevitably reduce the risk of 
error.  
Other more limited reform proposals focus like my own on barring death, if not a 
conviction. I proposed in 2001 that the evidence must foreclose all doubt before death 
could be imposed,206 and in 2002 that conducting a suggestive identification procedure 
must bar a death sentence.207 More proposals to assure greater reliability before imposing 
death are now on the legislative table. 
The Illinois Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment recommended 
barring death eligibility when the conviction was based on the uncorroborated testimony 
of a single eyewitness, or of an accomplice.208 Professor Rory K. Little goes further, 
positing in the upcoming “Addressing the Evidentiary Sources of Wrongful Convictions; 
Categorical Exclusion of Evidence in Capital Statutes”209 that legislatures should ban 
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seeking death if a prosecution is based primarily on one of the four most common sources 
of wrongful conviction evidence – eyewitness identification, false confession, criminal 
informants (jailhouse snitches), or invalidated (junk) science, whether singly or in 
combination.210 This ban would be immediately judicially enforceable and reviewable.211  
In a similar move, the Massachusetts Governor’s Council on Capital Punishment 
recommended that to impose death, 
the jury should be required to find that there is conclusive scientific evidence (ie. 
physical or other associative evidence) reaching a high level of scientific 
certainty, that connects the defendant to either the location of the crime scene, the 
murder weapon, or the victim’s body, and that strongly corroborates the 
defendant’s guilt of capital murder.212 
 
Governor Romney set up the Council to provide recommendations if Massachusetts were 
to consider reinstating the death penalty. But Innocence Project staff attorney Craig 
Cooley asserts in his 2007 article “Forensic Science and Capital Punishment Reform: An 
“Intellectually Honest” Assessment:’”213 that this Council recommendation would foster 
a false sense of confidence in capital convictions:  
Governor Romney’s directive to construct a forensically-dependent “foolproof’ 
death penalty system is misplaced, considering the numerous crime lab problems 
(across the country and especially in Massachusetts) and the lack of funding. … 
We have a broken system (the forensic science system) attempting to support 
another broken system (the death penalty system). Accordingly, because capital 
cases require and demand perfection, something the forensic science community 
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cannot presently offer, a capital system premised on forensic evidence, examiners, 
and labs will inevitably falter from the outset.214 
 
His article sets out to debunk several assumptions regarding forensic science, and 
presages weaknesses identified by the National Academy of Sciences in its recently-
released Report.215 The Governor’s Council anticipated many of these concerns in its 
own Report,216 but Cooley concludes “given the forensic science community’s current 
state of disarray, it is dangerous to assume that forensic science can and will cure the 
innumerable problems which infect the capital punishment system.”217 
 Notwithstanding these concerns, it does appear that such a limitation could 
provide at least some incremental protection against wrongful executions if the forensic 
science practices can be suitably ratcheted-up. Abolition of the death penalty is no doubt, 
however, the only true cure. 
Thus far, one state has taken up the banner of the Illinois and Massachusetts 
Governor’s Commissions. Though the effort in Maryland this spring was directed at 
abolition,218 it appears at this writing to have devolved into a reform measure with its 
roots in all these scholarly and commission proposals. Maryland Senate Bill 279 prohibits 
a capital prosecution in cases in which the state relies solely on evidence provided by 
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eyewitnesses.219 It then goes further, limiting death eligibility to cases with specified 
biological or DNA evidence of guilt, a videotaped confession, or a videotape that 
conclusively links the defendant to the homicide.220 Though repealing the death penalty 
altogether is surely preferred for its obvious power to avert mistaken executions, a bill of 
this type could significantly reduce mistakes if coupled with improved forensic testing 
practices as recommended in the National Academy of Sciences Report.    
 Along with ratcheting-up reliability requirements like corroboration or exclusions 
of death have come numerous proposals to provide broader authority to courts to set aside 
wrongful death sentences and convictions. The Massachusetts Council included such a 
general provision.221 Specific to eyewitness identification, one commentator urges “if a 
conviction is based solely on uncorroborated eyewitness testimony, appellate courts must 
engage a de novo review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the eyewitness 
identification and not be bound by current standards of clear abuse or abuse of 
discretion.”222  
Prof. D. Michael Risinger, following the lead of the British, proposes a process 
that reverses “unsafe verdicts.”223  Weak identification cases have often led to such 
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reversals in Britain.224 A verdict is unsafe if there is “lurking doubt” regarding guilt.225 
Prof. Risinger recommends an unsafe verdict review in the trial court and on appeal, and 
suggests “a special obligation [to reverse] when a conviction is undergirded with 
evidence known to be of questionable reliability, such as stranger-on-stranger eyewitness 
identification or “jailhouse snitch” testimony.”226 As in Britain, he “would oblige a court 
to consider any relevant fresh evidence, including research casting doubt on the evidence 
of a kind relied upon at trial, as long as that evidence was ‘not in hand’ and intentionally 
bypassed by trial counsel.”227  
Prof. Risinger also offers a three-part retrial opportunity analysis: if a verdict was 
viewed as unsafe, and if the fresh evidence is admissible, he would order a new trial; if 
new evidence clearly shows actual innocence, he would dismiss with double jeopardy 
effect; and if the verdict is necessarily subject to reasonable doubt, he would dismiss and 
a retrial would be possible only on application to a court after development of significant 
new evidence of guilt.228 Adding a requirement that the significant new evidence in such 
a retrial be independent, his three-part proffer is most inviting.  
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Finally, Prof. Risinger would add a fourth option in capital cases allowing a court 
to determine that the record makes the imposition of capital punishment unsafe and then 
to reverse the death sentence while affirming the conviction.229 The latter option is 
essentially that provided by the Model Penal Code 210.6 provision that bars death if the 
evidence does not foreclose all doubt about guilt, though Prof. Risinger does not refer to 
it.  
These proposals for reform have come from diverse sources, and take differing 
perspectives on the best way to ratchet up the reliability of eyewitness identifications 
practices and/or assure that outcomes are worthy of public trust.  
If we more broadly interpret the concept of reform, we can see that the recent 
legislative repeals of the death penalty in New Jersey and New Mexico are rooted in the 
same desire -- to avert wrongful executions. Just as Illinois Governor Ryan feared the 
ultimate nightmare of executing an innocent and granted clemency to all those on Illinois 
death row,230 New Jersey and New Mexico Governors have endorsed repeal to avoid an 
irrevocable mistake. As he ended the death penalty in New Mexico on March 18, 2009, 
Governor Bill Richardson stated: 
…I do not have the confidence in the criminal justice system as it currently 
operates to be the final arbiter when it comes to who lives and who dies for their 
crimes. …[T]he system to impose this penalty must be perfect and can never be 
wrong. But the reality is the system is not perfect – far from it. The system is 
inherently defective: DNA testing has proved that.231 
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Governor Jon Corzine echoed the same concern a few days before the New Jersey death 
penalty repeal bill came to his desk.232 The ultimate reform, then, is abolition of the death 
penalty, for it will prevent the ultimate nightmare. 
Conclusion 
I ended my 2002 article with the statement, “In a capital punishment system, we 
will never be able to altogether avoid being dead wrong, but we can try.” Since then, 
some states have wisely concluded that the only true solution in capital cases is repeal of 
the death penalty. They are to be applauded, and I hope more will follow. 
In non-capital cases, we can keep on trying to avoid being wrong -- by adopting 
best practices; assuring compliance by means of exclusion; admitting expert testimony 
and educating juries; instructing on the vagaries of eyewitness identification; requiring 
corroboration with independent and reliable evidence; and redressing unsafe verdicts.   
We need to. If we fail in this attempt, it is inevitable innocents will continue to be 
wrongly convicted. 
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